| 475 |
succeeds to invoke do_execve() with filename = "/bin/ls" and |
succeeds to invoke do_execve() with filename = "/bin/ls" and |
| 476 |
argv[0] = "/bin/cat". |
argv[0] = "/bin/cat". |
| 477 |
|
|
| 478 |
I introduced a keyword that permits the mismatch of |
I introduced a directive that permits the mismatch of |
| 479 |
basename of filename and argv[0]. |
basename of filename and argv[0]. |
| 480 |
|
|
| 481 |
Fix 2006/08/10 |
Fix 2006/08/10 |
| 1259 |
|
|
| 1260 |
Fix 2008/03/03 |
Fix 2008/03/03 |
| 1261 |
|
|
| 1262 |
@ Add "force_alt_exec" keyword. |
@ Add "force_alt_exec" directive. |
| 1263 |
|
|
| 1264 |
To be able to fully utilize "alt_exec" feature, |
To be able to fully utilize "alt_exec" feature, |
| 1265 |
I added "force_alt_exec" keyword so that |
I added "force_alt_exec" directive so that |
| 1266 |
all execute requests are replaced by the execute request of a program |
all execute requests are replaced by the execute request of a program |
| 1267 |
specified by alt_exec feature. |
specified by alt_exec feature. |
| 1268 |
|
|
| 1269 |
If this keyword is specified for a domain, the domain no longer |
If this directive is specified for a domain, the domain no longer |
| 1270 |
executes any programs regardless of the mode of file access control |
executes any programs regardless of the mode of file access control |
| 1271 |
(i.e. the domain won't execute even if MAC_FOR_FILE=0 ). |
(i.e. the domain won't execute even if MAC_FOR_FILE=0 ). |
| 1272 |
Instead, the domain executes the program specified by alt_exec feature |
Instead, the domain executes the program specified by alt_exec feature |
| 1301 |
|
|
| 1302 |
Fix 2008/03/10 |
Fix 2008/03/10 |
| 1303 |
|
|
| 1304 |
@ Rename "force_alt_exec" keyword to "execute_handler". |
@ Rename "force_alt_exec" directive to "execute_handler". |
| 1305 |
|
|
| 1306 |
To be able to use different programs for validating execve() parameters, |
To be able to use different programs for validating execve() parameters, |
| 1307 |
I moved the location to specify the program's pathname from profile |
I moved the location to specify the program's pathname from profile |
| 1308 |
to domain policy. |
to domain policy. |
| 1309 |
|
|
| 1310 |
The "execute_handler" keyword takes one pathname which is |
The "execute_handler" directive takes one pathname which is |
| 1311 |
invoked whenever execve() request is issued. Thus, any "allow_execute" |
invoked whenever execve() request is issued. Thus, any "allow_execute" |
| 1312 |
keywords in a domain with "execute_handler" are ignored. |
directives in a domain with "execute_handler" are ignored. |
| 1313 |
This keyword is designed for validating expected/desirable execve() |
This directive is designed for validating expected/desirable execve() |
| 1314 |
requests in userspace, although there is no way to tell the caller |
requests in userspace, although there is no way to tell the caller |
| 1315 |
that the execve() request was rejected. |
that the execve() request was rejected. |
| 1316 |
|
|
| 1317 |
@ Rename "alt_exec" keyword to "denied_execute_handler". |
@ Rename "alt_exec" directive to "denied_execute_handler". |
| 1318 |
|
|
| 1319 |
The "denied_execute_handler" keyword takes one pathname which is |
The "denied_execute_handler" directive takes one pathname which is |
| 1320 |
invoked only when execve() request was rejected. In other words, |
invoked only when execve() request was rejected. In other words, |
| 1321 |
this program is invoked only when the following conditions are met. |
this program is invoked only when the following conditions are met. |
| 1322 |
|
|
| 1323 |
(1) None of "allow_execute" keywords in the domain matched. |
(1) None of "allow_execute" directives in the domain matched. |
| 1324 |
(2) The execve() request was rejected in enforcing mode. |
(2) The execve() request was rejected in enforcing mode. |
| 1325 |
(3) "execute_handler" keyword is not used by the domain. |
(3) "execute_handler" directive is not used by the domain. |
| 1326 |
|
|
| 1327 |
This keyword is designed for handling unexpected/undesirable execve() |
This directive is designed for handling unexpected/undesirable execve() |
| 1328 |
requests, to redirect the process issuing such requests to somewhere. |
requests, to redirect the process issuing such requests to somewhere. |
| 1329 |
|
|
| 1330 |
Fix 2008/03/18 |
Fix 2008/03/18 |
| 1342 |
@ Disable execute handler loop. |
@ Disable execute handler loop. |
| 1343 |
|
|
| 1344 |
To be able to use "execute_handler" in a "keep_domain" domain, |
To be able to use "execute_handler" in a "keep_domain" domain, |
| 1345 |
ignore "execute_handler" and "denied_execute_handler" keywords |
ignore "execute_handler" and "denied_execute_handler" directives |
| 1346 |
if the current process is executing programs specified by |
if the current process is executing programs specified by |
| 1347 |
"execute_handler" or "denied_execute_handler" keyword. |
"execute_handler" or "denied_execute_handler" directive. |
| 1348 |
|
|
| 1349 |
This exception is needed to avoid infinite execute handler loop. |
This exception is needed to avoid infinite execute handler loop. |
| 1350 |
If a domain has both "keep_domain" and "execute_handler", |
If a domain has both "keep_domain" and "execute_handler", |
| 1501 |
@ Return 0 when ccs_may_umount() succeeds. |
@ Return 0 when ccs_may_umount() succeeds. |
| 1502 |
|
|
| 1503 |
I forgot to clear error value in ccs_may_umount() when the requested |
I forgot to clear error value in ccs_may_umount() when the requested |
| 1504 |
directory didn't match "deny_unmount" keyword. As a result, any umount() |
directory didn't match "deny_unmount" directive. As a result, any umount() |
| 1505 |
request with RESTRICT_UNMOUNT=enforcing returned -EPERM error. |
request with RESTRICT_UNMOUNT=enforcing returned -EPERM error. |
| 1506 |
|
|
| 1507 |
Version 1.6.2 2008/06/25 Usability enhancement release. |
Version 1.6.2 2008/06/25 Usability enhancement release. |
| 1630 |
@ Don't transit to new domain until do_execve() succeeds. |
@ Don't transit to new domain until do_execve() succeeds. |
| 1631 |
|
|
| 1632 |
Until now, a process's domain was updated to new domain which the process |
Until now, a process's domain was updated to new domain which the process |
| 1633 |
will belongs to before do_execve() succeeds so that the kernel can do |
will belong to before do_execve() succeeds so that the kernel can do |
| 1634 |
permission checks for interpreters and environment variables based on |
permission checks for interpreters and environment variables based on |
| 1635 |
new domain. But this caused a subtle problem when other process sends |
new domain. But this caused a subtle problem when other process sends |
| 1636 |
signals to the process, for the process returns to old domain if |
signals to the process, for the process returns to old domain if |
| 1651 |
As the number of parameters is increasing, I modified to use a structure |
As the number of parameters is increasing, I modified to use a structure |
| 1652 |
for passing parameters. |
for passing parameters. |
| 1653 |
|
|
| 1654 |
@ Always allow updating task state for signal operations. |
Fix 2008/10/11 |
| 1655 |
|
|
| 1656 |
ccs_check_signal_acl() was skipping permission checks if signal is NULL |
@ Remove domain_acl_lock mutex. |
| 1657 |
or sent to self or sent to same domain. To make it possible to update |
|
| 1658 |
task state when current process is sending NULL signal or to self or |
I noticed that I don't need to keep all functions that modify an ACL of |
| 1659 |
to same domain, I modified to check ACL anyway. The result of access |
a domain mutually exclusive. Since each functions handles different type |
| 1660 |
control will not change, but this modification will generate granted logs |
of ACL, locking is needed only when they append an ACL to a domain. |
| 1661 |
which were not generated until now. |
So, I modified to use local locks. |
| 1662 |
|
|
| 1663 |
|
Fix 2008/10/14 |
| 1664 |
|
|
| 1665 |
|
@ Fix ccs_check_condition() bug. |
| 1666 |
|
|
| 1667 |
|
Due to a bug in ccs_check_condition(), it was impossible to use |
| 1668 |
|
task.state[0] task.state[1] task.state[2] inside condition part |
| 1669 |
|
if the ACL does not treat a pathname. For example, an ACL like |
| 1670 |
|
|
| 1671 |
|
allow_network TCP connect @HTTP_SERVERS 80 if task.state[0]=100 |
| 1672 |
|
|
| 1673 |
|
didn't work. |
| 1674 |
|
|
| 1675 |
|
Fix 2008/10/15 |
| 1676 |
|
|
| 1677 |
|
@ Show process information in /proc/ccs/.process_status . |
| 1678 |
|
|
| 1679 |
|
To be able to determine a process's type, I added a command "info PID" |
| 1680 |
|
which returns process information of the specified PID in |
| 1681 |
|
"PID manager=\* execute_handler=\* state[0]=\$ state[1]=\$ state[2]=\$" |
| 1682 |
|
format. |
| 1683 |
|
|
| 1684 |
|
Fix 2008/10/20 |
| 1685 |
|
|
| 1686 |
|
@ Use rcu_dereference() when walking the list. |
| 1687 |
|
|
| 1688 |
|
I was using "dependency ordering" for appending an element to a list |
| 1689 |
|
without asking the reader to take a lock. But "dependency ordering" |
| 1690 |
|
is not respected by DEC Alpha or by some aggressive value-speculation |
| 1691 |
|
compiler optimizations. |
| 1692 |
|
|
| 1693 |
|
On such environment, use of "dependency ordering" can lead to system |
| 1694 |
|
crash because the reader might read uninitialized value of newly |
| 1695 |
|
appended element. |
| 1696 |
|
|
| 1697 |
|
To prevent the reader from reading uninitialized value of newly appended |
| 1698 |
|
element, I inserted rcu_dereference() when walking the list. |
| 1699 |
|
|
| 1700 |
|
Fix 2008/11/04 |
| 1701 |
|
|
| 1702 |
|
@ Use sys_getpid() instead for current->pid. |
| 1703 |
|
|
| 1704 |
|
Kernel 2.6.24 introduced PID namespace. |
| 1705 |
|
|
| 1706 |
|
To compare PID given from userland, I can't use current->pid. |
| 1707 |
|
So, I modified to use sys_getpid() instead for current->pid. |
| 1708 |
|
|
| 1709 |
|
I modified to use task_tgid_nr_ns() for 2.6.25 and later instead for |
| 1710 |
|
current->tgid when checking /proc/self/ in get_absolute_path(). |
| 1711 |
|
|
| 1712 |
|
Fix 2008/11/07 |
| 1713 |
|
|
| 1714 |
|
@ Fix is_alphabet_char(). |
| 1715 |
|
|
| 1716 |
|
is_alphabet_char() should match 'A' - 'Z' and 'a' - 'z', |
| 1717 |
|
but was matching from 'A' - 'F' and 'a' - 'f'. |
| 1718 |
|
|
| 1719 |
|
@ Add /proc/ccs/.execute_handler . |
| 1720 |
|
|
| 1721 |
|
Process information became visible to userspace by |
| 1722 |
|
"Show process information in /proc/ccs/.process_status" feature. |
| 1723 |
|
However, programs specified by execute_handler directive may run as |
| 1724 |
|
non root user, making it impossible to see process information. |
| 1725 |
|
|
| 1726 |
|
So, I added a new interface that allows execute handler processes |
| 1727 |
|
to see process information. The content of /proc/ccs/.execute_handler is |
| 1728 |
|
identical to /proc/ccs/.process_status . |
| 1729 |
|
|
| 1730 |
|
Version 1.6.5 2008/11/11 Third anniversary release. |
| 1731 |
|
|
| 1732 |
|
Fix 2008/12/01 |
| 1733 |
|
|
| 1734 |
|
@ Introduce "task.type=execute_handler" condition. |
| 1735 |
|
|
| 1736 |
|
The execute_handler directive is very very powerful. You can use this |
| 1737 |
|
directive to do anything you want to do (e.g. logging and validating and |
| 1738 |
|
modifying command line parameters and environment variables, opening and |
| 1739 |
|
closing and redirecting files, creating pipes to implement antivirus and |
| 1740 |
|
spam filtering, deploying a DMZ between the ssh daemon and the login |
| 1741 |
|
shells). |
| 1742 |
|
|
| 1743 |
|
To be able to use this directive in a domain with keep_domain directive |
| 1744 |
|
while limiting access to resources needed for such purposes to only |
| 1745 |
|
programs invoked as an execute handler process, I added a new condition. |
| 1746 |
|
|
| 1747 |
|
In learning mode, "if task.type=execute_handler" condition part will be |
| 1748 |
|
automatically added for requests issued by an execute_handler process. |
| 1749 |
|
|
| 1750 |
|
@ Introduce file's type and permissions as conditions. |
| 1751 |
|
|
| 1752 |
|
To be able to limit file types a process can access, I added |
| 1753 |
|
new conditions for checking file's type and permissions. |
| 1754 |
|
For example, |
| 1755 |
|
|
| 1756 |
|
allow_read /etc/fstab if path1.type=file path1.perm=0644 |
| 1757 |
|
|
| 1758 |
|
will allow opening /etc/fstab for reading only if /etc/fstab is a regular |
| 1759 |
|
file and it's permission is 0644, and |
| 1760 |
|
|
| 1761 |
|
allow_write /dev/null if path1.type=char path1.dev_major=1 path1.dev_minor=3 |
| 1762 |
|
|
| 1763 |
|
will allow opening /dev/null for writing only if /dev/null is a character |
| 1764 |
|
device file with major=1 and minor=3 attributes. |
| 1765 |
|
|
| 1766 |
|
@ Add memory quota for temporary memory used for auditing. |
| 1767 |
|
|
| 1768 |
|
Although there are MAX_GRANT_LOG and MAX_REJECT_LOG parameters |
| 1769 |
|
which limit the number of entries for audit logs so that we can avoid |
| 1770 |
|
memory consumption by audit logs, it would be more convenient if we can |
| 1771 |
|
also limit the size in bytes. |
| 1772 |
|
Thus, I added a new quota line. |
| 1773 |
|
|
| 1774 |
|
echo Dynamic: 1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo |
| 1775 |
|
|
| 1776 |
|
This quota is not applied to temporary memory used for permission checks. |
| 1777 |
|
|
| 1778 |
|
Fix 2008/12/09 |
| 1779 |
|
|
| 1780 |
|
@ Fix ccs_can_save_audit_log() checks. |
| 1781 |
|
|
| 1782 |
|
Due to incorrect statement "if (ccs_can_save_audit_log() < 0)" |
| 1783 |
|
while ccs_can_save_audit_log() is boolean, MAX_GRANT_LOG and |
| 1784 |
|
MAX_REJECT_LOG were not working. |
| 1785 |
|
|
| 1786 |
|
This bug will trigger OOM killer if /usr/sbin/ccs-auditd is not working. |
| 1787 |
|
|
| 1788 |
|
Fix 2008/12/24 |
| 1789 |
|
|
| 1790 |
|
@ Add "ccs_" prefix. |
| 1791 |
|
|
| 1792 |
|
To be able to tell whether a symbol is TOMOYO Linux related or not, |
| 1793 |
|
I added "ccs_" prefix as much as possible. |
| 1794 |
|
|
| 1795 |
|
@ Fix ccs_check_flags() error message. |
| 1796 |
|
|
| 1797 |
|
I meant to print SYAORAN-ERROR: message when error == -EPERM, |
| 1798 |
|
but I was printing it when error == 0 since 1.6.0 . |
| 1799 |
|
|
| 1800 |
|
Fix 2009/01/05 |
| 1801 |
|
|
| 1802 |
|
@ Use kmap_atomic()/kunmap_atomic() for reading "struct linux_binprm". |
| 1803 |
|
|
| 1804 |
|
As remove_arg_zero() uses kmap_atomic(KM_USER0), I modified to use |
| 1805 |
|
kmap_atomic(KM_USER0) rather than kmap(). |
| 1806 |
|
|
| 1807 |
|
Fix 2009/01/28 |
| 1808 |
|
|
| 1809 |
|
@ Fix "allow_read" + "allow_write" != "allow_read/write" problem. |
| 1810 |
|
|
| 1811 |
|
Since 1.6.0 , due to a bug in ccs_update_single_path_acl(), |
| 1812 |
|
appending "allow_read/write" entry didn't update internal "allow_read" |
| 1813 |
|
and "allow_write" entries. As a result, attempt to open(O_RDWR) succeeds |
| 1814 |
|
but open(O_RDONLY) and open(O_WRONLY) fail. |
| 1815 |
|
|
| 1816 |
|
Workaround is to write an entry twice when newly appending that entry. |
| 1817 |
|
If written twice, internal "allow_read" and "allow_write" entries |
| 1818 |
|
are updated. |
| 1819 |
|
|
| 1820 |
|
Fix 2009/02/26 |
| 1821 |
|
|
| 1822 |
|
@ Fix profile read error. |
| 1823 |
|
|
| 1824 |
|
Incorrect profiles were shown in /proc/ccs/profile |
| 1825 |
|
if either CONFIG_SAKURA or CONFIG_TOMOYO is disabled. |
| 1826 |
|
|
| 1827 |
|
Fix 2009/03/02 |
| 1828 |
|
|
| 1829 |
|
@ Undelete CONFIG_TOMOYO_AUDIT option. |
| 1830 |
|
|
| 1831 |
|
While HDD-less systems can use profiles with MAX_GRANT_LOG=0 and |
| 1832 |
|
MAX_REJECT_LOG=0 , I undeleted CONFIG_TOMOYO_AUDIT option for saving |
| 1833 |
|
memory used for /proc/ccs/grant_log and /proc/ccs/reject_log interfaces. |
| 1834 |
|
|
| 1835 |
|
Fix 2009/03/13 |
| 1836 |
|
|
| 1837 |
|
@ Show only profile entry names ever specified. |
| 1838 |
|
|
| 1839 |
|
Even if an administrator specifies only COMMENT= and MAC_FOR_FILE= |
| 1840 |
|
entries for /proc/ccs/profile , all available profile entries are shown. |
| 1841 |
|
This was designed to help administrators to know what entries are |
| 1842 |
|
available, but sometimes makes administrators feel noisy because of |
| 1843 |
|
entries showing default values. |
| 1844 |
|
|
| 1845 |
|
Thus, I modified to show only profile entry names ever specified. |
| 1846 |
|
|
| 1847 |
|
Fix 2009/03/18 |
| 1848 |
|
|
| 1849 |
|
@ Add MAC_FOR_IOCTL functionality. |
| 1850 |
|
|
| 1851 |
|
To be able to restrict ioctl() requests, I added MAC_FOR_IOCTL |
| 1852 |
|
functionality. |
| 1853 |
|
|
| 1854 |
|
This functionality requires modification of ccs-patch-\*.diff . |
| 1855 |
|
|
| 1856 |
|
@ Use better name for socket's pathname. |
| 1857 |
|
|
| 1858 |
|
Until now, socket's pathname was represented as "socket:[\$]" format |
| 1859 |
|
where \$ is inode's number. But inode's number is useless for name based |
| 1860 |
|
access control. Therefore, I modified to represent socket's pathname as |
| 1861 |
|
"socket:[family=\$:type=\$:protocol=\$]" format. |
| 1862 |
|
|
| 1863 |
|
This will help administrator to control ioctl() against sockets more |
| 1864 |
|
precisely. |
| 1865 |
|
|
| 1866 |
|
@ Fix misplaced ccs_capable() call. (only 2.6.8-\* and 2.6.9-\*) |
| 1867 |
|
|
| 1868 |
|
Location to insert ccs_capable(TOMOYO_SYS_IOCTL) in sys_ioctl() was |
| 1869 |
|
wrong since version 1.1 . |
| 1870 |
|
|
| 1871 |
|
@ Insert ccs_check_ioctl_permission() call. |
| 1872 |
|
|
| 1873 |
|
To make MAC_FOR_IOCTL functionality working, I inserted |
| 1874 |
|
ccs_check_ioctl_permission() call into ccs-patch-\*.diff . |
| 1875 |
|
|
| 1876 |
|
Fix 2009/03/23 |
| 1877 |
|
|
| 1878 |
|
@ Move sysctl()'s check from ccs-patch-\*.diff to fs/tomoyo_file.c . |
| 1879 |
|
|
| 1880 |
|
Since try_parse_table() in kernel/sysctl.c is almost identical between |
| 1881 |
|
all versions, I moved that function to fs/tomoyo_file.c . |
| 1882 |
|
|
| 1883 |
|
@ Relocate definitions and functions. |
| 1884 |
|
|
| 1885 |
|
To reduce exposed symbols, I relocated some definitions and functions. |
| 1886 |
|
|
| 1887 |
|
Fix 2009/03/24 |
| 1888 |
|
|
| 1889 |
|
@ Add CONFIG_TOMOYO_BUILTIN_INITIALIZERS option. |
| 1890 |
|
|
| 1891 |
|
Some systems don't have /sbin/modprobe and /sbin/hotplug . |
| 1892 |
|
Thus, I made these pathnames configurable. |
| 1893 |
|
|
| 1894 |
|
Version 1.6.7 2009/04/01 Feature enhancement release. |
| 1895 |
|
|
| 1896 |
|
Fix 2009/04/06 |
| 1897 |
|
|
| 1898 |
|
@ Drop "undelete domain" command. |
| 1899 |
|
|
| 1900 |
|
I added "undelete domain" command on 2007/01/19, but never used by policy |
| 1901 |
|
management tools. The garbage collector I added on 2007/01/29 will |
| 1902 |
|
automatically reuse memory and allow administrators switch domain policy |
| 1903 |
|
periodically, provided that the administrator kills processes in old |
| 1904 |
|
domains before recreating new domains with the same domainnames. |
| 1905 |
|
|
| 1906 |
|
Thus, I dropped "undelete domain" command. |
| 1907 |
|
|
| 1908 |
|
@ Escape invalid characters in ccs_check_mount_permission2(). |
| 1909 |
|
|
| 1910 |
|
ccs_check_mount_permission2() was passing unencoded strings to printk() |
| 1911 |
|
and ccs_update_mount_acl() and ccs_check_supervisor(). This may cause |
| 1912 |
|
/proc/ccs/system_policy and /proc/ccs/query to contain invalid |
| 1913 |
|
characters within a string. |
| 1914 |
|
|
| 1915 |
|
Fix 2009/04/07 |
| 1916 |
|
|
| 1917 |
|
@ Fix IPv4's "address_group" handling error. |
| 1918 |
|
|
| 1919 |
|
Since 1.6.5 , due to lack of ntohl() (byte order conversion) in |
| 1920 |
|
ccs_update_address_group_entry(), "address_group" with IPv4 address was |
| 1921 |
|
not working. |
| 1922 |
|
|
| 1923 |
|
This problem happens on little endian platforms (e.g. x86). |
| 1924 |
|
|
| 1925 |
|
Fix 2009/04/20 |
| 1926 |
|
|
| 1927 |
|
@ Update recvmsg() hooks. |
| 1928 |
|
|
| 1929 |
|
Since 1.5.0, I was doing network access control for incoming UDP and RAW |
| 1930 |
|
packets inside skb_recv_datagram(). But to synchronize with LSM version, |
| 1931 |
|
I moved ccs_recv_datagram_permission() hook from skb_recv_datagram() to |
| 1932 |
|
udp_recvmsg()/udpv6_recvmsg()/raw_recvmsg()/rawv6_recvmsg() with name |
| 1933 |
|
change to ccs_recvmsg_permission(). |
| 1934 |
|
|
| 1935 |
|
Fix 2009/05/08 |
| 1936 |
|
|
| 1937 |
|
@ Add condition for symlink's target pathname. |
| 1938 |
|
|
| 1939 |
|
Until now, "allow_symlink" keyword allows creation of a symlink but does |
| 1940 |
|
not check the symlink's target. Usually it is no problem because |
| 1941 |
|
permission checks are done using dereferenced pathname. But in some |
| 1942 |
|
cases, we should restrict the symlink's target. For example, |
| 1943 |
|
"ln -s .htpasswd /var/www/html/readme.html" by CGI program should be |
| 1944 |
|
blocked because we will allow Apache to read both |
| 1945 |
|
/var/www/html/readme.html and /var/www/html/.htpasswd . |
| 1946 |
|
|
| 1947 |
|
Thus, I added new condition, "symlink.target". |
| 1948 |
|
|
| 1949 |
|
allow_symlink /var/www/html/\*.html if symlink.target="\*.html" |
| 1950 |
|
|
| 1951 |
|
allow_symlink /var/www/html/\*\-.\* if symlink.target="\*\-.\*" |
| 1952 |
|
|
| 1953 |
|
@ Don't return -EAGAIN at ccs_socket_recvmsg_permission(). |
| 1954 |
|
|
| 1955 |
|
It turned out that it is not permitted for accept() and recvmsg() to |
| 1956 |
|
return -EAGAIN if poll() said connections/datagrams are ready. However, |
| 1957 |
|
recvmsg() may return -EAGAIN and potentially confuse some applications |
| 1958 |
|
because ccs_socket_recvmsg_permission() is returning -EAGAIN. |
| 1959 |
|
|
| 1960 |
|
Thus, I modified ccs_socket_recvmsg_permission() to return -ENOMEM |
| 1961 |
|
rather than -EAGAIN. |
| 1962 |
|
|
| 1963 |
|
Fix 2009/05/19 |
| 1964 |
|
|
| 1965 |
|
@ Don't call get_fs_type() with a mutex held. |
| 1966 |
|
|
| 1967 |
|
Until now, when ccs_update_mount_acl() is called with unsupported |
| 1968 |
|
filesystem, /sbin/modprobe is executed from get_fs_type() to load |
| 1969 |
|
filesystem module. And get_fs_type() does not return until /sbin/modprobe |
| 1970 |
|
finishes. |
| 1971 |
|
|
| 1972 |
|
This means that it will cause deadlock if /sbin/modprobe (which is |
| 1973 |
|
executed via get_fs_type() in ccs_update_mount_acl()) calls |
| 1974 |
|
ccs_update_mount_acl(); although it won't happen unless an administrator |
| 1975 |
|
inserts execute_handler to call mount() requests in learning mode or to |
| 1976 |
|
add "allow_mount" entries to /proc/ccs/system_policy . |
| 1977 |
|
|
| 1978 |
|
I modified to unlock the mutex before calling get_fs_type(). |
| 1979 |
|
|
| 1980 |
|
Version 1.6.8 2009/05/?? Feature enhancement release. |
TOMOYO
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