| 1101 |
To my surprise, "mount --bind source dest" accepts |
To my surprise, "mount --bind source dest" accepts |
| 1102 |
not only "both source and dest are directory" |
not only "both source and dest are directory" |
| 1103 |
but also "both source and dest are non-directory". |
but also "both source and dest are non-directory". |
| 1104 |
I was rejecting if dest is not a derectory in AddMountACL(). |
I was rejecting if dest is not a directory in AddMountACL(). |
| 1105 |
|
|
| 1106 |
@ Change log format. |
@ Change log format. |
| 1107 |
|
|
| 1119 |
|
|
| 1120 |
@ Change internal data structure. |
@ Change internal data structure. |
| 1121 |
|
|
| 1122 |
Since I don't have more than 32 types of capability permissions and |
Since I don't have more than 16 types of file permissions, |
| 1123 |
16 types of file permissions, I combined them using bit-fields. |
I combined them using bit-fields. |
| 1124 |
|
|
| 1125 |
Each entry had a field for conditional permission support. |
Each entry had a field for conditional permission support. |
| 1126 |
But since this field is unlikely used, I separated the field from |
But since this field is unlikely used, I separated the field from |
| 1127 |
common part. |
common part. |
| 1128 |
|
|
| 1129 |
These changes will reduce memory used by policy. |
These changes will reduce memory used by policy. |
| 1130 |
|
|
| 1131 |
|
Fix 2008/01/15 |
| 1132 |
|
|
| 1133 |
|
@ Add ptrace() hook. |
| 1134 |
|
|
| 1135 |
|
To prevent attackers from controlling important processes using |
| 1136 |
|
ptrace(), I added a hook for ptrace(). |
| 1137 |
|
Most programs (except strace(1) and gdb(1)) won't use ptrace(2). |
| 1138 |
|
|
| 1139 |
|
@ Fix sleep condition check in CheckSocketRecvDatagramPermission(). |
| 1140 |
|
|
| 1141 |
|
It seems that correct method to use is in_atomic() |
| 1142 |
|
rather than in_interrupt() because in_atomic() returns nonzero |
| 1143 |
|
whenever scheduling is not allowed. |
| 1144 |
|
|
| 1145 |
|
Fix 2008/01/24 |
| 1146 |
|
|
| 1147 |
|
@ Support /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user. |
| 1148 |
|
|
| 1149 |
|
Until now, only root user can access /proc/ccs/ interface. |
| 1150 |
|
But to permit /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user so that |
| 1151 |
|
it won't require ssh login by root user when administrating |
| 1152 |
|
from remote host, I eased restrictions on this interface. |
| 1153 |
|
|
| 1154 |
|
(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0) || |
| 1155 |
|
(current->uid != 0 && current->uid == inode->i_uid) || |
| 1156 |
|
(current->gid != 0 && current->gid == inode->i_gid) |
| 1157 |
|
|
| 1158 |
|
The inode's uid and gid are set using chown/chgrp commands. |
| 1159 |
|
|
| 1160 |
|
Fix 2008/02/05 |
| 1161 |
|
|
| 1162 |
|
@ Use find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_pid(). |
| 1163 |
|
|
| 1164 |
|
Kernel 2.6.24 introduced PID namespace. |
| 1165 |
|
To search PID given from userland, the kernel needs to use |
| 1166 |
|
find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_pid(). |
| 1167 |
|
|
| 1168 |
|
Fix 2008/02/14 |
| 1169 |
|
|
| 1170 |
|
@ Add execve() parameter checking. |
| 1171 |
|
|
| 1172 |
|
Until now, it was impossible to check argv[] and envp[] parameters |
| 1173 |
|
passed to execve(). |
| 1174 |
|
I expanded conditional permission syntax so that |
| 1175 |
|
{ argc, envc, argv[] , envp[] } parameters can be checked if needed. |
| 1176 |
|
This will allow administrator permit execution of /bin/sh only when |
| 1177 |
|
/bin/sh is invoked in the form of "/bin/sh -c" and environment variable |
| 1178 |
|
HOME is set by specifying |
| 1179 |
|
|
| 1180 |
|
allow_execute /bin/sh if exec.argv[1]="-c" exec.envp["HOME"]!=NULL |
| 1181 |
|
|
| 1182 |
|
in the policy. |
| 1183 |
|
This extension will make exploit codes difficult to start /bin/sh because |
| 1184 |
|
they unlikely set up environment variables and unlikely specify "-c" |
| 1185 |
|
option when invoking /bin/sh , whereas proper functions likely set up |
| 1186 |
|
environment variables and likely specify "-c" option. |
| 1187 |
|
|
| 1188 |
|
Fix 2008/02/18 |
| 1189 |
|
|
| 1190 |
|
@ Add process state checking. |
| 1191 |
|
|
| 1192 |
|
Until now, it was impossible to change ACL without executing program. |
| 1193 |
|
I added three variables for performing stateful checking within a domain. |
| 1194 |
|
You can set current process's state like: |
| 1195 |
|
|
| 1196 |
|
allow_network TCP accept @TRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=1 |
| 1197 |
|
allow_network TCP accept @UNTRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=0 |
| 1198 |
|
|
| 1199 |
|
and you can use the state like |
| 1200 |
|
|
| 1201 |
|
allow_read /path/to/important/file if task.state[0]=1 |
| 1202 |
|
|
| 1203 |
|
in the policy. |
| 1204 |
|
The state changes when the request was granted by the MAC's policy, |
| 1205 |
|
so please be careful with situations where the state has changed successfully |
| 1206 |
|
but the request was not processed because of other reasons (e.g. out of memory). |
TOMOYO
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