| 933 |
|
|
| 934 |
@ Fix ReadAddressGroupPolicy() bug. |
@ Fix ReadAddressGroupPolicy() bug. |
| 935 |
|
|
| 936 |
ReadAddressGroupPolicy() fails if both "path_group" and "address_group" are used |
ReadAddressGroupPolicy() fails if both "path_group" and "address_group" |
| 937 |
because I forgot to set "head->read_var1 = NULL". |
are used because I forgot to set "head->read_var1 = NULL". |
| 938 |
|
|
| 939 |
Fix 2007/07/10 |
Fix 2007/07/10 |
| 940 |
|
|
| 949 |
|
|
| 950 |
@ Remove mount-flags manipulation. |
@ Remove mount-flags manipulation. |
| 951 |
|
|
| 952 |
Until now, administrator is permitted to turn on/off specific mount options |
Until now, administrator is permitted to turn on/off specific mount |
| 953 |
regardless of mount options passed to kernel. |
options regardless of mount options passed to kernel. |
| 954 |
I removed this feature because "exact option matching" sounds better than |
I removed this feature because "exact option matching" sounds better than |
| 955 |
"automatic option enabler/disabler". |
"automatic option enabler/disabler". |
| 956 |
|
|
| 957 |
@ Remove /proc/ccs/info/mapping . |
@ Remove /proc/ccs/info/mapping . |
| 958 |
|
|
| 959 |
I removed /proc/ccs/info/mapping because nobody seems to use this feature. |
I removed /proc/ccs/info/mapping because nobody seems to use this |
| 960 |
|
feature. |
| 961 |
|
|
| 962 |
@ Call external policy loader automatically. |
@ Call external policy loader automatically. |
| 963 |
|
|
| 981 |
can handle interactive operations by opening /dev/console . |
can handle interactive operations by opening /dev/console . |
| 982 |
Now, there is no difference between init=/sbin/ccs-init and |
Now, there is no difference between init=/sbin/ccs-init and |
| 983 |
call_usermodehelper("/sbin/ccs-init"), and users no longer need to |
call_usermodehelper("/sbin/ccs-init"), and users no longer need to |
| 984 |
add init=/sbin/ccs-init parameter to load policy before /sbin/init starts. |
add init=/sbin/ccs-init parameter to load policy before /sbin/init |
| 985 |
|
starts. |
| 986 |
|
|
| 987 |
Fix 2007/08/14 |
Fix 2007/08/14 |
| 988 |
|
|
| 1144 |
rather than in_interrupt() because in_atomic() returns nonzero |
rather than in_interrupt() because in_atomic() returns nonzero |
| 1145 |
whenever scheduling is not allowed. |
whenever scheduling is not allowed. |
| 1146 |
|
|
|
Fix 2008/01/24 |
|
|
|
|
|
@ Support /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user. |
|
|
|
|
|
Until now, only root user can access /proc/ccs/ interface. |
|
|
But to permit /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user so that |
|
|
it won't require ssh login by root user when administrating |
|
|
from remote host, I eased restrictions on this interface. |
|
|
|
|
|
(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0) || |
|
|
(current->uid != 0 && current->uid == inode->i_uid) || |
|
|
(current->gid != 0 && current->gid == inode->i_gid) |
|
|
|
|
|
The inode's uid and gid are set using chown/chgrp commands. |
|
|
|
|
| 1147 |
Fix 2008/02/05 |
Fix 2008/02/05 |
| 1148 |
|
|
| 1149 |
@ Use find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_pid(). |
@ Use find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_pid(). |
| 1189 |
|
|
| 1190 |
in the policy. |
in the policy. |
| 1191 |
The state changes when the request was granted by the MAC's policy, |
The state changes when the request was granted by the MAC's policy, |
| 1192 |
so please be careful with situations where the state has changed successfully |
so please be careful with situations where the state has changed |
| 1193 |
but the request was not processed because of other reasons (e.g. out of memory). |
successfully but the request was not processed because of other reasons |
| 1194 |
|
(e.g. out of memory). |
| 1195 |
|
|
| 1196 |
|
Fix 2008/02/26 |
| 1197 |
|
|
| 1198 |
|
@ Support /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user. |
| 1199 |
|
|
| 1200 |
|
Until now, only root user can access /proc/ccs/ interface. |
| 1201 |
|
But to permit /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user so that it won't require |
| 1202 |
|
ssh login by root user when administrating from remote host, |
| 1203 |
|
I made "(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0)" requirement optional. |
| 1204 |
|
If this requirement is disabled, only "conventional DAC permission |
| 1205 |
|
checks" and "/proc/ccs/manager checks" are used. |
| 1206 |
|
|
| 1207 |
|
Fix 2008/02/29 |
| 1208 |
|
|
| 1209 |
|
@ Add sleep_on_violation feature. |
| 1210 |
|
|
| 1211 |
|
Some exploit codes (e.g. trans2open for Samba) continue running |
| 1212 |
|
until it achieves the purpose of the exploit code (e.g. invoke /bin/sh). |
| 1213 |
|
|
| 1214 |
|
If such code is injected due to buffer overflow but the kernel |
| 1215 |
|
rejects the request, it triggers infinite "Permission denied" loop. |
| 1216 |
|
As a result, the CPU usage becomes 100% and gives bad effects to |
| 1217 |
|
the rest of processes. |
| 1218 |
|
This is a side effect of rejecting the request from the exploit code |
| 1219 |
|
which wouldn't happen if the request from the exploit code was granted. |
| 1220 |
|
|
| 1221 |
|
To avoid such CPU consumption, I added a penalty that forcibly |
| 1222 |
|
sleeps for specified period when a request is rejected. |
| 1223 |
|
|
| 1224 |
|
This penalty doesn't work if the exploit code does nothing but |
| 1225 |
|
continue running, but I think most exploit code's purpose is |
| 1226 |
|
to start some program rather than to slow down the target system. |
| 1227 |
|
|
| 1228 |
|
@ Add alt_exec feature. |
| 1229 |
|
|
| 1230 |
|
Since TOMOYO Linux's approach is "know all essential requests in advance |
| 1231 |
|
and create policy that permits only them", you can regard anomalous |
| 1232 |
|
requests as attacks (if you want to do so). |
| 1233 |
|
|
| 1234 |
|
Common MAC implementations merely reject requests that violate policy. |
| 1235 |
|
But I added a special handler for execve() to TOMOYO Linux. |
| 1236 |
|
|
| 1237 |
|
This handler is triggered when a process requested to execute a program |
| 1238 |
|
but the request was rejected by the policy. |
| 1239 |
|
This handler executes a program specified by the administrator |
| 1240 |
|
instead of a program requested by the process. |
| 1241 |
|
|
| 1242 |
|
Most attackers attempt to execute /bin/sh to start something malicious. |
| 1243 |
|
Attackers execute an exploit code using buffer overflow vulnerability |
| 1244 |
|
to steal control of a process. But this handler can get back control |
| 1245 |
|
if an exploit code requests execve() that is not permitted by policy. |
| 1246 |
|
|
| 1247 |
|
By default, this handler does nothing (i.e. merely reject execve() |
| 1248 |
|
request). You can specify any program to start what you want to do. |
| 1249 |
|
|
| 1250 |
|
You can redirect attackers to somewhere else (e.g. honeypot). |
| 1251 |
|
This makes it possible to act your Linux box as an on-demand honeypot |
| 1252 |
|
while keeping regular services for your usage. |
| 1253 |
|
|
| 1254 |
|
You can collect information of the attacker (e.g. IP address) and |
| 1255 |
|
update firewall configuration. |
| 1256 |
|
|
| 1257 |
|
You can silently terminate a process who requested execve() |
| 1258 |
|
that is not permitted by policy. |
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