1.8.x/ccs-patch/README.ccs

Notes for TOMOYO Linux project

This is a handy Mandatory Access Control patch for Linux kernels.
This patch is released under the GPLv2.

Project URL: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/

The authors of this patch (hereafter, we) don't have much experience
in kernel programming. We are worried that this patch would contain
some mistakes such as missing hooks, improper location of hooks,
potential deadlocks. There would be better way of implementation.
All kinds of comments, pointing the errors and suggestions are welcome.

We do hope this patch reduces the labor of server security management
and you enjoy the life with Linux.

This project was very inspired by the comic "Card Captor SAKURA",
one of the CLAMP's masterworks.
The names SAKURA and TOMOYO and SYAORAN were borrowed from the comic
with the heartfelt thanks to CLAMP.


ChangeLog:

Version 1.0   2005/11/11   First release.

Fix 2005/11/18

    @ Add setattr() missing hook in SYAORAN fs.

      setattr() checking for special inode was missing.

Fix 2005/11/25

    @ Allow initrd.img include /sbin/init .

      Since version 1.0 loads policy when /sbin/init is called
      for the first time, initrd.img without the policy directory
      mustn't start /sbin/init . This forced users not to use
      initrd.img that includes /sbin/init .
      I modified to delay loading policy if the policy directory
      doesn't exist and wait for /sbin/init being called again.

Fix 2005/12/02

    @ Use lookup_one_len() instead of lookup_hash().

      Kernel 2.6.15 changed parameters for lookup_hash().
      I modified to use lookup_one_len() to keep compatibility.

Fix 2005/12/06

    @ Add S_ISDIR() check in SYAORAN fs.

      Malicious configuration file that attempts to create an inode
      under non-directory inode caused segmentation fault.

Version 1.0.1 2005/12/08   Minor update release.

Fix 2006/01/04

    @ Add CheckWritePermission() check in unix_bind().

      I modified to check write permission in unix_bind(), for
      sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) checks write permission.

    @ Show hook version in proc_misc_init().

      The hook part of this patch depends on the kernel's version,
      while the rest part of this patch doesn't.
      I added the hook version so that the administrator can
      know the last modified date of the hooks.

    @ Move permission checks from filp_open() to open_namei().

      I moved the location of checking MAC's permission
      from filp_open() to open_namei().

    @ Fix an error in filp_open().  (only 2.6.15-rc5)

      This error was only in the patch 2.6.15-rc5 and
      was fixed in the patch for 2.6.15.

Fix 2006/01/12

    @ Add /proc/ccs/info/self_domain.

      I added /proc/ccs/info/self_domain so that the userland programs
      can know the name of domain they belong to if necessary.

Fix 2006/01/13

    @ Merge constants for CheckTaskCapability().

      I merged *_INHERITABLE_* and *_LOCAL_* to avoid always
      calling CheckTaskCapability() with both constants.

    @ DropTaskCapability() returns -EAGAIN on success.

      DropTaskCapability() must not return 0 on success, for
      DropTaskCapability() is called from do_execve().

    @ Fix an error for chroot() permission check.

      The chroot() restriction was not working due to the following mistake.
      CheckChRootPermission() || CheckTaskCapability() returns 0 or 1, while
      CheckChRootPermission() | CheckTaskCapability() returns 0 or -EPERM.

Fix 2006/01/17

    @ Suppress some of debug messages in TOMOYO.

      I added KERN_DEBUG to suppress some of debug messages.

Fix 2006/01/19

    @ Remove isRoot() checks in AddChrootACL() and AddMountACL().

      I found a program that needs to chroot by non-root.
      So, I stopped checking uid=euid=0 for these functions so that
      "accept mode" can append ACLs.
      The isRoot() is checked at AddChrootPolicy() and AddMountPolicy().

    @ Map NULL device name to "<NULL>" in AddMountACL().

      VMware mounts vmware-hgfs with NULL device name.
      So I mapped NULL device name to "<NULL>".

Fix 2006/01/20

    @ Suppress some of debug messages in SAKURA.

      I added KERN_DEBUG to suppress some of debug messages.

    @ Call panic() if failed to load given profile.

      Call panic() if profile index was given via CCS= parameter
      but the profile doesn't exist.
      If CCS= parameter is not given, the kernel attempts to load
      profile 0, but it doesn't call panic() if profile 0 doesn't exist.

Fix 2006/01/24

    @ Use full_name_hash() for IsGloballyReadableFile().

      I modified to use full_name_hash() for faster scan.

    @ Add signal checking condition in CheckSignalACL().

      The documentation says "if the target domain's domainname
      starts with the source domain's domainname, it is always granted"
      but actually it isn't. I'll change the documentation instead of
      changing the source code.

      Also, checking for pid = -1 was missing. This error was fixed.

Fix 2006/02/09

    @ Use mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock instead of down()/up().

      Kernel 2.6.16 changed members of "struct inode".
      I modified to use mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock() for after 2.6.16
      and down()/up() for before 2.6.16.

Version 1.0.2 2006/02/14   Many bug-fixes release.

Fix 2006/02/21

    @ Divide generic-write permission into individual write permissions.

      Write permission was divided into the following permissions.

      'mkdir'     for creating directory.
      'rmdir'     for deleting directory.
      'create'    for creating regular file.
      'unlink'    for deleting non-directory.
      'mksock'    for creating UNIX domain socket.
      'mkfifo'    for creating FIFO.
      'mkchar'    for creating character device.
      'mkblock'   for creating block device.
      'link'      for creating hard link.
      'symlink'   for creating symbolic link.
      'rename'    for renaming directory or non-directory.
      'truncate'  for truncating regular file.

      The permission check for opening files is done using
      conventional read/write/execute permission.

    @ Add /proc/ccs/info/mapping.

      I added /proc/ccs/info/mapping so that the userland programs
      can know the mapping of individual write permissions.

Fix 2006/02/27

    @ Fix handling of trailing '\*' in PathMatchesToPattern().

      PathMatchesToPattern("/tmp/", "/tmp/\*") returned true
      because "\*" matches to "more than or equals to 0 character
      until '/' or end". But since this is a comparison between
      directory and non-directory, this should not match.

      This behavior causes the following security risks.
      In enforce mode, allowing "2 /tmp/\*" grants
      "mkdir /tmp/" and "rmdir /tmp/" which should be
      granted only when "2 /tmp/" is allowed.
      In accept mode, "mkdir /tmp/" or "rmdir /tmp/" appends
      "2 /tmp/\*" into the domain policy if "file_pattern /tmp/\*"
      is in the exception policy.

      I changed not to ignore trailing '\*' in the pattern
      if pathname ends with '/'.

Fix 2006/03/01

    @ Add missing spinlock in GetAbsolutePath().

      vfsmount_lock was missing.

Fix 2006/03/08

    @ Add support for "shared subtree" mount operations.

      Kernel 2.6.15 introduced "shared subtree" functionality.
      But CheckMountPermission() couldn't recognize flags for
      do_change_type().

    @ Add support for more mount flags.

      atime/noatime, diratime/nodiratime, recurse/norecurse flags
      are supported.

Fix 2006/03/20

    @ Check port numbers for only AF_INET/AF_INET6.

      CheckBindEntry() and CheckConnectEntry() should check port numbers
      only when the given address family is either AF_INET or AF_INET6,
      for address family such as AF_UNSPEC could be passed to bind()
      and connect() for PF_INET/PF_INET6 sockets.

Fix 2006/03/27

    @ Use /proc/self/ rather than /proc/\$/ for current process.

      GetAbsolutePath() now uses "self" instead of pid
      if current process refers to information related to itself.
      This exception violates the rule "TOMOYO Linux's pathnames don't
      contain symbolic links before the last '/'", but I think it worth
      to do so. The following are the merits gained by this exception.

      Prevent administrators from granting redundant permissions
      when a process needs to refer to only current process's information.

      Allow administrators make current process's information always
      readable using 'allow_read' directive.

Version 1.1   2006/04/01   Functionality enhancement release.

Fix 2006/04/03

    @ Use queue instead of fixed sized array for audit log.

      WriteAuditLog() now uses queue to save statically allocated memory.
      Administrators can give any size for audit logs at runtime.

    @ Use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() + memset().

      kmalloc() + memset() were replaced with kzalloc().

Fix 2006/04/04

    @ Support "delayed enforcing" mode.

      Until now, access request was immediately rejected
      if policy doesn't allow that access and the system is
      running in enforce mode.
      Sometimes, especially after updating softwares,
      some unexpected access requests arise from proper procedure.
      Such access requests should be granted because
      they are not caused by malicious attacks.
      So I introduced a mechanism to allow administrator some grace
      to decide to grant or reject such access requests.
      This mechanism is implemented in the following manner.
        "Don't return immediately if permission denied."
        "Sleep for a while waiting administrator's decision."
        "Return successfully if administrator tells to do so."

Fix 2006/04/12

    @ Fix handling of prefix in GetAbsolutePath().

      Some objects doesn't have prefix "/".
      Pipe has prefix "pipe:" and socket has prefix "socket:".
      GetAbsolutePath() couldn't handle prefixes other than '/' properly.

    @ Remove IsCorrectPath() checks for File Access Control functions.

      File Access Control functions accepted only pathnames that start
      with '/' because these functions assumed pathnames returned by
      GetAbsolutePath() always start with '/'.
      However, I found a program that opens an unnamed pipe via
      (probably) /proc/PID/fd/ directory. (You can see entries like
      "pipe:[number]" if you run "ls -l /proc/*/fd/".)
      Now, File Access Control functions have to accept pathnames
      that don't start with '/'. So, I stopped checking IsCorrectPath().

Fix 2006/04/19

    @ Fix handling of NULL nameidata in vfs_open().

      In 2.6 kernels, NFS daemon and sys_mq_open() call
      vfs_create() with NULL nameidata. In such cases,
      CheckSingleWritePermission() must not be called.

Version 1.1.1 2006/05/15   Functionality enhancement release.

Fix 2006/05/16

    @ Support program files aggregation.

      Until now, programs that have no fixed names and their
      parent programs had to be run in a trusted domain
      since it is impossible to use patterns for granting
      execute permission and defining domains.
      I introduced a mechanism to aggregate similar programs
      using 'aggregator' directive.
      Some examples:

        'aggregator /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? /tmp/logrotate.tmp'
        to run all temporary programs for logrotate as /tmp/logrotate.tmp

        'aggregator /usr/bin/tac /bin/cat'
        to run /usr/bin/tac and /bin/cat as /bin/cat

Fix 2006/05/18

    @ Unlimit max count for audit log.

      I forgot to replace MAX_GRANT_LOG and MAX_REJECT_LOG with INT_MAX
      so that administrators can give any size for audit logs at runtime.

Fix 2006/05/22

    @ Support individual domain ACL removal.

      Until now, to remove ACLs from a domain, administrator had to
      once delete and recreate that domain, which wastes a lot of memory.
      I introduced a mechanism to remove domain ACL without deleting and
      recreating domains.
      Administrator can delete domains or remove ACLs from domains
      via /proc/ccs/policy/domain_policy .
      /proc/ccs/policy/delete_domain and /proc/ccs/policy/update_domain
      were removed.

Fix 2006/05/30

    @ Add missing spinlock in SAKURA_MayMount().

      vfsmount_lock was missing.

Version 1.1.2 2006/06/02   Functionality enhancement release.

Fix 2006/06/13

    @ Merge tomoyo_connect.c and tomoyo_bind.c into tomoyo_port.c

      I merged these files that have only difference CONNECT and BIND,
      that are likely to be enabled both or neither.

    @ Add CONFIG_TOMOYO_AUDIT option.

      I made auditing functions as optional because some Linux boxes
      may have not enough disk space to store audit logs.

Fix 2006/06/15

    @ Support use of symbolic links for program execution.

      Until now, domains for programs executed by dereferencing
      symbolic links were defined using dereferenced pathnames.
      This was inconvenient for some Linux boxes who use busybox but
      can't keep hard links of busybox.
      I introduced a mechanism to allow using pathnames of
      symbolic links using 'alias' directive.
      Some examples:

        'alias /sbin/busybox /bin/ls' to run /bin/ls
        (which is a symbolic link to /sbin/busybox) as /bin/ls
        if /bin/ls is executed.

        'alias /bin/bash /bin/sh' to run /bin/sh
        (which is a symbolic link to /bin/bash) as /bin/sh
        if /bin/sh is executed.

Fix 2006/06/21

    @ Use ccs_alloc() instead of kzalloc().

      To detect memory leaks,
      I added a wrapper for tracing kmalloc() and kfree().
      There is no way to detect memory leaks caused by ccs-*.txt .

Version 1.1.3 2006/07/13   Functionality enhancement release.

Fix 2006/07/14

    @ Change behavior of pathname pattern matching.

      Until now, it was impossible to use patterns like "\*.txt"
      because "\*" matched to more than 0 characters until next '/'.
      Now, "\*" matches to more than 0 characters.

      Until now, it was impossible to use patterns like "\$00"
      because "\$" matched to more than 1 digits until next
      non digit character.
      Now, "\$" matches to more than 1 digits.

      Also, new patterns "\x" "\X" "\a" "\A" "\@" are added.

Fix 2006/07/21

    @ Add CONFIG_TOMOYO_NETWORK option.

      Until now, only port numbers for TCP and UDP were controllable.
      Now, the combination of IPv4/IPv6 address and port numbers
      for TCP and UDP is controllable.
      CONFIG_TOMOYO_NETWORKPORT became obsolete.

Fix 2006/07/25

    @ Change matching rule for CheckFileACL().

      Until now, only first entry that matched to the requested pathname
      was used for permission checking. For example, two entries

      "2 /tmp/file-\$.txt"
      "4 /tmp/fil\?-0.txt"

      are given in this order and requested pathname is "/tmp/file-0.txt",
      the "2 /tmp/file-\$.txt" is used. But if two entries

      "4 /tmp/fil\?-0.txt"
      "2 /tmp/file-\$.txt"

      are given in this order, the "4 /tmp/fil\?-0.txt" is used.
      This may potentially cause trouble because the result of
      permission checks depends on the order of entries.

      Now, all entries that matched to the requested pathname
      are used for permission checking so that the result of
      permission checks doesn't depend on the order of entries.

Fix 2006/07/27

    @ Support RAW IPv4/IPv6 control.

      Some programs such as 'ping' and 'traceroute' use raw IP socket.
      Now, the combination of IPv4/IPv6 address and protocol numbers
      for IP is controllable.

Fix 2006/08/04

    @ Add filename and argv[0] comparison check.

      The domain transition was done based on filename passed to do_execve(),
      while the behavior was defined based on argv[0].
      There is no problem if the filename is argv[0]-unaware application.
      But if argv[0]-aware, access control bypassing happens if the process
      transits to trusted domain but behaves as different program.
      For example, when the administrator specifies domain for /bin/ls as
      trusted but both /bin/ls and /bin/cat are links to /sbin/busybox ,
      a cracker can run /bin/cat in a trusted domain if the cracker
      succeeds to invoke do_execve() with filename = "/bin/ls" and
      argv[0] = "/bin/cat".

      I introduced a keyword that permits the mismatch of
      basename of filename and argv[0].

Fix 2006/08/10

    @ Support ID based condition checks.

      It was impossible to use process id (uid and gid and so on) for
      checking individual domain ACL.

      Now it became possible to use process id for checking individual
      domain ACL. For example,

        "1 /bin/sh if task.euid!=0"
 
      allows the domain to execute /bin/sh only when the process's euid
      is not 0, and

        "6 /home/\*/\* if task.uid=path1.uid"

      allows the domain to read-write user's home directory
      only when the file's owner matches to the process's uid.

Fix 2006/08/22

    @ Fix ROUNDUP() in fs/realpath.c .

      Alignment using sizeof(int) may be inappropriate for 64bit environment.
      I changed to use the larger size of 'void *' and 'long'
      instead of 'int'.
      For environment where sizeof(int) = sizeof(long) = sizeof(void *),
      this change has no effect.

Version 1.2   2006/09/03   Functionality enhancement release.

Fix 2006/09/30

    @ Fix CheckFilePerm() in fs/tomoyo_file.c .

      The location to call path_release() was too early.

Fix 2006/10/02

    @ Support per-domain profile.

      It became possible to assign different profiles for different domains.
      This will help administrators using building up approach.

Fix 2006/10/05

    @ Change parameters for CheckFilePerm().

      I was re-resolving pathnames inside CheckFilePerm() even though
      the caller function already resolved them.
      So I changed to pass dentry and vfsmount instead of pathname,
      and removed changes made on 2006/09/30.

Fix 2006/10/06

    @ Support deny_rewrite and allow_rewrite permission.

      It became possible to make regular files append-only
      using "deny_rewrite" directive in exception policy and
      override it using "allow_rewrite" directive in domain policy.

      Regular files specified using "deny_rewrite" directive
        can't be open()ed with O_TRUNC or without O_APPEND,
        can't be truncate()ed or ftruncate()ed,
        can't be turned O_APPEND flag off using fcntl(F_SETFL)
      unless specified using "allow_rewrite" directive.

Fix 2006/10/12

    @ Enable configuration options by default for kernel config.

      CONFIG_SAKURA and CONFIG_TOMOYO are now 'y' by default
      and CONFIG_SYAORAN is now 'm' by default.

Fix 2006/10/13

    @ Use external policy loader.

      Until now, policies are loaded when /sbin/init starts and
      initial control levels are switched using CCS= parameter.
      But since some boxes have to fixate kernel command line options
      at compilation time, I think it will become more flexible
      by running external policy loader using init= parameter so that
      initial control levels can be specified before /sbin/init starts.

      Call panic() if initial control levels are not specified.

Fix 2006/10/16

    @ Add missing parameter in FindNextDomain().

      'struct file' was needed for allowing 'if path1.*' checks.

Fix 2006/10/23

    @ Print error messages in CheckFlags().

      Some users seem to have troubles picking up all necessary
      entries for the configuration file of SYAORAN filesystem
      since makesyaoranconf can't pick up entries that are
      nonexistent at the time.
      I added error message so that users can find missing entries
      using dmesg.

Fix 2006/10/24

    @ Change /proc/ccs/info/self_domain .

      I changed /proc/ccs/info/self_domain to return
      the domain of open time rather than first read time.
      This modification makes shell's redirection usage
      more convenient since redirection opens file
      but doesn't read at the time.

      'cat < /proc/ccs/info/self_domain' will return
      the domain of shell, and
      'cat /proc/ccs/info/self_domain' will return
      the domain of cat .

Fix 2006/11/06

    @ Replace MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE with ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE.

      Since it was inconvenient that requests that are waiting for
      supervisor's decision are rejected automatically when
      MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE seconds has elapsed, I modified WriteAnswer()
      reset timeout counter whenever a supervisor's decision is written
      and I modified ccs-queryd write a dummy decision every seconds
      so that the requests won't be rejected automatically as long as
      ccs-queryd is running.
      This change made MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE's meaning boolean.
      So I fixated MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE to 10 seconds and removed
      MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter.
      To allow administrators selectively enable "delayed enforcing"
      mode, I added ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter.
      The behavior of "delayed enforcing" mode is defined
      in the following order.

      (1) The requests are rejected immediately if ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=0.
      (2) The requests are rejected immediately
          if nobody is opening /proc/ccs/policy/query interface.
      (3) The requests won't be rejected automatically
          if ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=1 and ccs-queryd is running.
      (4) The requests will be rejected in 10 seconds
          if somebody other than ccs-queryd (such as less(1)) is
          opening /proc/ccs/policy/query interface, for
          such process doesn't write dummy decisions.

Version 1.3   2006/11/11   First anniversary release.

Fix 2006/11/13

    @ Replace trust_domain with keep_domain.

      Since it was troublesome that there are two elements that can disable MAC
      (assigning a profile that doesn't enable MAC or registering domains
      with trust_domain directive), I removed trust_domain directive.
      Instead, I introduced keep_domain directive to not to transit domains
      unless a program registered with initializer directive is executed.
      This change has the following advantages.

      (1) Allows administrator use "enforce mode" for operations after login.
          Since it was difficult to know what commands and files are invoked
          and accessed in what sequences beforehand, we had to use trust_domain
          directive for such domain, allowing users invoke any commands and
          access any files in any sequence.
          But now, we can use keep_domain directive and assign a profile for
          "enforce mode" for such domain, forcing users invoke only allowed
          commands and access only allowed files in any sequence
          while these operations are kept under the control of "enforce mode".

      (2) Allows administrator determine easily whether the domain is
          under MAC or not because only the profile currently assigned to
          the domain determines it.

      (3) Saves total number of domains and memory.

Fix 2006/11/22

    @ Don't allow use of undefined profile.

      To avoid assigning undefined profile to domains by error,
      I added checks before assigning profiles to domains.
      Now, profiles have to be defined prior to assigning them to domains.

Version 1.3.1 2006/12/08   Minor update release.

Fix 2006/12/10

    @ Allow pathname grouping.

      To reduce the labor of repeating '/\*' to allow access recursively,
      I introduced a macro 'path_group' to make group such pathnames.
      For example, you had to give like

        4 /var/www/html/\*
        4 /var/www/html/\*/\*
        4 /var/www/html/\*/\*/\*
        4 /var/www/html/\*/\*/\*/\*

      but now, you can give just

        4 @WEB-CONTENTS

      if you give

        path_group WEB-CONTENTS /var/www/html/\*
        path_group WEB-CONTENTS /var/www/html/\*/\*
        path_group WEB-CONTENTS /var/www/html/\*/\*/\*
        path_group WEB-CONTENTS /var/www/html/\*/\*/\*/\*

      in the exception policy.
      This macro will be useful when grouping different directories.

Fix 2006/12/15

    @ Use structured pathnames instead for simple 'char *'.

      To reduce the cost of strcmp(), I changed the return value of
      SaveName() from 'const char *' to 'const struct path_info *'.
      This change will speed up PathMatchesToPattern() comparison.

Fix 2006/12/19

    @ Allow registering policy managers using domainnames.

      It was difficult to restrict programs that can update policies
      via /proc/ccs/ interfaces using pathnames of these programs, for
      these programs could be unintendedly invoked.
      Now, it became possible to restrict domains that can update policies
      via /proc/ccs/ interfaces as well as programs.
      By restricting using domainnames, it becomes easier to avoid
      unintended invocation.

Fix 2006/12/22

    @ Add initialize_domain,no_initizlize_domain,no_keep_domain

      To control domain transitions more strictly,
      initialize_domain,no_initizlize_domain,no_keep_domain directives
      were introduced.

      "initialize_domain /some/program" means
      jump to "<kernel> /some/program" domain if /some/program is
      called from any domain.
      This is equivalent to conventional "initializer /some/program".

      "initialize_domain /some/program from some_domain" means
      jump to "<kernel> /some/program" domain only if /some/program is
      called from "some_domain" domain.

      "no_initialize_domain /some/program" means
      don't jump to "<kernel> /some/program" domain even if
      "initialize_domain /some/program" or
      "initialize_domain /some/program from some_domain" are given
      if /some/program is called from any domain.

      "no_initialize_domain /some/program from some_domain" means
      don't jump to "<kernel> /some/program" domain even if
      "initialize_domain /some/program" or
      "initialize_domain /some/program from some_domain" are given
      if /some/program is called from "some_domain" domain.

      "keep_domain some_domain" means don't jump to child domain
      if any programs are called from "some_domain" domain.

      "keep_domain /some/program from some_domain" means
      don't jump to child domain only if /some/program is
      called from "some_domain" domain.

      "no_keep_domain some_domain" means
      jump to child domain even if
      "keep_domain /some/program" or
      "keep_domain /some/program from some_domain" are given
      if any programs are called from "some_domain" domain.

      "no_keep_domain /some/program from some_domain" means
      jump to child domain even if
      "keep_domain /some/program" or
      "keep_domain /some/program from some_domain" are given
      if /some/program is called from "some_domain" domain.

      "some_domain" can be just the last component of domainname.
      For example, giving "/bin/mail" as "some_domain" matches to
      all domains whose domainname ends with "/bin/mail".

Fix 2007/01/19

    @ Allow reuse of memory allocated for domain policy.

      Regarding domain policy, unlike other policies, didn't have
      "is_deleted" flag and new memory were allocated
      if the deleted entries are given again.
      But to allow administrators switch domain policy periodically,
      I introduced "is_deleted" flag.

      Writing "some_domain" to /proc/ccs/policy/domain_policy
      creates "some_domain" using new memory if it didn't exist.

      Writing "select some_domain" doesn't create "some_domain"
      if it didn't exist.

      Writing "delete some_domain" deletes "some_domain"
      but does not delete entries in "some_domain".

      Writing "undelete some_domain" undeletes "some_domain"
      if it was deleted by "delete some_domain".

Fix 2007/01/22

    @ Allow getting already deleted pathnames.

      To allow getting pathnames that are already deleted,
      I removed (IS_ROOT(dentry) || !d_unhashed(dentry)) check.

Fix 2007/01/26

    @ Limit string length to 4000.

      I was using PAGE_SIZE (4096 in many environments)
      as the max length of any string data.
      But for environments that have larger PAGE_SIZE,
      doing memset(ptr, 0, PAGE_SIZE) everytime is too wasteful.

Fix 2007/01/29

    @ Add garbage collector for domain policy.

      Writing "some_domain" to /proc/ccs/policy/domain_policy
      creates "some_domain" using new memory only if
      some process is staying at that deleted domain.
      If no process is staying at that deleted domain,
      "some_domain" is undeleted with all ACLs deleted.

Version 1.3.2 2007/02/14   Usability enhancement release.

Fix 2007/02/20

    @ Allow address grouping.

      To reduce the labor of repeating similar IPv4/IPv6 addresses,
      I introduced a macro 'address_group' to make group such addresses.
      For example, you had to give like

        allow_network TCP accept 10.0.0.0-10.255.255.255 1024-65535
        allow_network TCP accept 172.16.0.0-172.31.255.255 1024-65535
        allow_network TCP accept 192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255 1024-65535

      but now, you can give just

        allow_network TCP accept @localnet 1024-65535

      if you give

        address_group localnet 10.0.0.0-10.255.255.255
        address_group localnet 172.16.0.0-172.31.255.255
        address_group localnet 192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255

      in the exception policy.

Fix 2007/03/03

    @ Remove obsolete functions.

    @ Add some hooks.

      Read permission check is done if open_exec()
      is called from search_binary_handler().
      Read permission check is not done if open_exec()
      is called from do_execve(), instead,
      execute permission check is done at
      search_binary_handler_with_transition().

      I moved the location of calling CheckCapabilityACL()
      and CheckMountPermission() from sys_mount() to do_mount().

Fix 2007/03/07

    @ Use 'unsigned int' for sscanf().

      I compiled SYAORAN fs on x86_64 environment and found
      the compiler showing warning messages about size of data types.
      Since size of data types may mismatch for sscanf(),
      I replaced some types with 'unsigned int'.

Version 1.4   2007/04/01   x86_64 support release.

Fix 2007/04/18

    @ Change argv[0] checking rule.

      I was comparing the basename of symbolic link's pathname and argv[0].
      Since execute permission check and domain transition are done
      based on realpath while argv[0] check is done based on the symlink's
      pathname and argv[0], this specification will allow attackers behave
      as /bin/cat in the domain of /bin/ls if "/bin/ls and /bin/cat are
      links to /sbin/busybox" and "the attacker is permitted to create 
      a symlink named ~/cat that points to /bin/ls" and "the attacker is
      permitted to run /bin/ls".
      So, I changed to compare the basename of realpath and argv[0].
      Also, I moved the location to compare before processing
      "aggregator" directive so that
      "aggregator /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? /tmp/logrotate.tmp"
      won't cause the mismatch of the basename of realpath and argv[0].

      If /bin/ls is a symlink to /sbin/busybox, then
      creating a symlink named ~/cat that points to /bin/ls and
      executing ~/cat won't work as expected because permission check and
      domain transition are done using /sbin/busybox (realpath of /bin/ls)
      and will be rejected since the administrator won't grant
      "1 /sbin/busybox".

Fix 2007/05/07

    @ Support pathname subtraction.

      There was no way to exclude specific pathnames when granting
      permissions using wildcards.
      There would be a need to exclude specific files and directories.
      I introduced "\-" as subtraction operator.

        "A\-B" means "A" other than "B".
        "A\-B\-C" means "A" other than "B" and "C".
        "A\-B\-C\-D" means "A" other than "B" and "C" and "D".

      "A", "B", "C", "D" may contain wildcards.

      An example usage is "/home/\*/\*\-.ssh/\*", which means
      "/home/\*/\*/\*" other than "/home/\*/.ssh/\*".

      "A" should contain wildcards because subtraction from constants
      (e.g. "/usr\-usr/" or "/usr\-home/") is meaningless.

      Don't try "A\-B\+C" because "\+" is not addition operator.

Fix 2007/05/24

    @ Fix autobind hook.

      The location to call SAKURA_MayAutobind() in net/ipv4/udp.c
      and net/ipv6/udp.c were wrong.

Fix 2007/06/03

    @ Add a space in MakeMountOptions().

      I forgot to add a space after "atime" and "noatime".

Version 1.4.1 2007/06/05   Minor update release.

Fix 2007/07/04

    @ Fix ReadAddressGroupPolicy() bug.

      ReadAddressGroupPolicy() fails if both "path_group" and "address_group"
      are used because I forgot to set "head->read_var1 = NULL".

Fix 2007/07/10

    @ Add compat_sys_stime() hook.

      Some of 64bit kernels support compat_sys_stime()
      but permission check was missing.

Version 1.4.2 2007/07/13   Bug fix release.

Fix 2007/08/06

    @ Remove mount-flags manipulation.

      Until now, administrator is permitted to turn on/off specific mount
      options regardless of mount options passed to kernel.
      I removed this feature because "exact option matching" sounds better than
      "automatic option enabler/disabler".

    @ Remove /proc/ccs/info/mapping .

      I removed /proc/ccs/info/mapping because nobody seems to use this
      feature.

    @ Call external policy loader automatically.

      Until now, users had to add init=/.init parameter to load policy
      before /sbin/init starts.
      I inserted call_usermodehelper() to call external policy loader when 
      execve("/sbin/init") is requested and external policy loader exists.

      This change will remove init=/.init parameter from most environment,
      although call_usermodehelper() can't handle interactive operations.

    @ Move external policy loader from /.init to /sbin/ccs-init .

      Installing programs in / directory is not good for packaging.

Fix 2007/08/13

    @ Update external policy loader.

      It turned out that /sbin/ccs-init invoked via call_usermodehelper()
      can handle interactive operations by opening /dev/console .
      Now, there is no difference between init=/sbin/ccs-init and
      call_usermodehelper("/sbin/ccs-init"), and users no longer need to
      add init=/sbin/ccs-init parameter to load policy before /sbin/init
      starts.

Fix 2007/08/14

    @ Update recvmsg() hooks.

      Until now, it was impossible to apply network access control for
      incoming UDP and RAW packets if they are brought to userland using
      read() or recvmsg() with NULL address because address buffer is NULL.
      I moved hooks from sock_recvmsg() to skb_recv_datagram() so that
      network access control for incoming UDP and RAW packets always work.

Fix 2007/08/16

    @ Return appropriate error code for CheckMountPermission().

      I was returning -EPERM if something is wrong with CheckMountPermission().
      But SELinux determines whether selinuxfs is supported by kernel
      based on whether error code is -ENODEV or not.
      So I stopped returning -EPERM unconditionally.

Fix 2007/08/17

    @ Remove initializer directive.

      Use "initialize_domain" instrad of "initializer".

Fix 2007/08/21

    @ Fix "allow_argv0 ... if if ..." bug.

      It was impossible to use a word "if" to the second argument of
      allow_argv0 if condition part is used.

Fix 2007/08/24

    @ Move /proc/ccs/\*/\* to /proc/ccs/\* .

      Some pathnames for /proc/ccs/ interface were changed.

Fix 2007/09/05

    @ Drop MSG_PEEK'ed message before skb_free_datagram().

      I need to remove head message from unwanted source
      from socket's receive queue so that the caller can pick up
      next message from wanted source with MSG_PEEK flags.

Version 1.5.0 2007/09/20   Usability enhancement release.

Fix 2007/09/27

    @ Avoid eating memory after quota exceeded.

      Although ACL entries in a domain won't be added if the domain's quota
      has exceeded, SaveName() in AddFileACL() is called anyway.
      This caused unneeded memory consumption.

      Now, quota checking is done before getting domain_acl_lock lock.
      This may exceed quota by one or two entries, but that won't matter.

Fix 2007/10/16

    @ Add environment variable check.

      There are environment variables that may cause dangerous behavior
      like LD_\* .
      So I introduced 'allow_env' directive that allows specified
      environment variable inherited to next domain.
      Unlike other permissions, this check is done at execve() time
      using next domain's ACL information.

      To manage commonly inherited environments like PATH ,
      you can use 'allow_env' directive in exception policy
      to globally grant specified environment variable.

Fix 2007/11/05

    @ Replace semaphore with mutex.

      I replaced semaphore with mutex.

    @ Add missing down() in AddReservedEntry().

      Mutex debugging capability told me that I had forgotten to call down()
      since TOMOYO version 1.3.2 .
      This function is not called by learning mode,
      so the semaphore's counter will not overflow for normal usage.

Fix 2005/11/27

    @ Fix ReadTable() truncation bug.

      "snprintf(str, size, format, ...) >= size" means truncated.
      But I was checking for "snprintf(str, size, format, ...) > size".
      As a result, some entries might be dumped without '\n'.

    @ Purge direct "->prev"/"->next" manipulation.

      All list manipulations use "struct list_head" or "struct list1_head".
      "struct list1_head" doesn't have "->prev" member to save memory usage.

Fix 2007/11/29

    @ Add missing semaphore in GetEXE().

      mm->mmap_sem was missing.

Fix 2007/12/17

    @ Remove unused EXPORT_SYMBOL().

      Mark some functions static.

Fix 2007/12/18

    @ Fix AddMountACL() rejection bug.

      To my surprise, "mount --bind source dest" accepts
      not only "both source and dest are directory"
      but also "both source and dest are non-directory".
      I was rejecting if dest is not a directory in AddMountACL().

    @ Change log format.

      Profile number and mode is added in audit logs.

Fix 2008/01/03

    @ Change directive for file's read/write/execute permission.

      Directives for file's read/write/execute permissions were
      4/2/1 respectively. But for easier understanding, they are now
      replaced by read/write/execute (e.g. "allow_read" instead of "4").
      But for easier inputting, 4/2/1 are still accepted instead of
      allow_read/allow_write/allow_execute respectively.

    @ Change internal data structure.

      Since I don't have more than 16 types of file permissions,
      I combined them using bit-fields.

      Each entry had a field for conditional permission support.
      But since this field is unlikely used, I separated the field from
      common part.

      These changes will reduce memory used by policy.

Fix 2008/01/15

    @ Add ptrace() hook.

      To prevent attackers from controlling important processes using
      ptrace(), I added a hook for ptrace().
      Most programs (except strace(1) and gdb(1)) won't use ptrace(2).

    @ Fix sleep condition check in CheckSocketRecvDatagramPermission().

      It seems that correct method to use is in_atomic()
      rather than in_interrupt() because in_atomic() returns nonzero
      whenever scheduling is not allowed.

Fix 2008/02/05

    @ Use find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_by_pid().

      Kernel 2.6.24 introduced PID namespace.
      To search PID given from userland, the kernel needs to use
      find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_by_pid().

Fix 2008/02/14

    @ Add execve() parameter checking.

      Until now, it was impossible to check argv[] and envp[] parameters
      passed to execve().
      I expanded conditional permission syntax so that
      { argc, envc, argv[] , envp[] } parameters can be checked if needed.
      This will allow administrator permit execution of /bin/sh only when
      /bin/sh is invoked in the form of "/bin/sh -c" and environment variable
      HOME is set by specifying

        allow_execute /bin/sh if exec.argv[1]="-c" exec.envp["HOME"]!=NULL

      in the policy.
      This extension will make exploit codes difficult to start /bin/sh because
      they unlikely set up environment variables and unlikely specify "-c"
      option when invoking /bin/sh , whereas proper functions likely set up
      environment variables and likely specify "-c" option.

Fix 2008/02/18

    @ Add process state checking.

      Until now, it was impossible to change ACL without executing program.
      I added three variables for performing stateful checking within a domain.
      You can set current process's state like:

        allow_network TCP accept @TRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=1
        allow_network TCP accept @UNTRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=0

      and you can use the state like

        allow_read /path/to/important/file if task.state[0]=1

      in the policy.
      The state changes when the request was granted by the MAC's policy,
      so please be careful with situations where the state has changed
      successfully but the request was not processed because of other reasons
      (e.g. out of memory).

Fix 2008/02/26

    @ Support /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user.

      Until now, only root user can access /proc/ccs/ interface.
      But to permit /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user so that it won't require
      ssh login by root user when administrating from remote host,
      I made "(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0)" requirement optional.
      If this requirement is disabled, only "conventional DAC permission
      checks" and "/proc/ccs/manager checks" are used.

Fix 2008/02/29

    @ Add sleep_on_violation feature.

      Some exploit codes (e.g. trans2open for Samba) continue running
      until it achieves the purpose of the exploit code (e.g. invoke /bin/sh).

      If such code is injected due to buffer overflow but the kernel
      rejects the request, it triggers infinite "Permission denied" loop.
      As a result, the CPU usage becomes 100% and gives bad effects to
      the rest of processes.
      This is a side effect of rejecting the request from the exploit code
      which wouldn't happen if the request from the exploit code was granted.

      To avoid such CPU consumption, I added a penalty that forcibly
      sleeps for specified period when a request is rejected.

      This penalty doesn't work if the exploit code does nothing but
      continue running, but I think most exploit code's purpose is
      to start some program rather than to slow down the target system.

    @ Add alt_exec feature.

      Since TOMOYO Linux's approach is "know all essential requests in advance
      and create policy that permits only them", you can regard anomalous
      requests as attacks (if you want to do so).

      Common MAC implementations merely reject requests that violate policy.
      But I added a special handler for execve() to TOMOYO Linux.

      This handler is triggered when a process requested to execute a program
      but the request was rejected by the policy.
      This handler executes a program specified by the administrator
      instead of a program requested by the process.

      Most attackers attempt to execute /bin/sh to start something malicious.
      Attackers execute an exploit code using buffer overflow vulnerability
      to steal control of a process. But this handler can get back control
      if an exploit code requests execve() that is not permitted by policy.

      By default, this handler does nothing (i.e. merely reject execve()
      request). You can specify any program to start what you want to do.

      You can redirect attackers to somewhere else (e.g. honey pot).
      This makes it possible to act your Linux box as an on-demand honey pot
      while keeping regular services for your usage.

      You can collect information of the attacker (e.g. IP address) and
      update firewall configuration.

      You can silently terminate a process who requested execve()
      that is not permitted by policy.

Fix 2008/03/03

    @ Add "force_alt_exec" keyword.

      To be able to fully utilize "alt_exec" feature,
      I added "force_alt_exec" keyword so that
      all execute requests are replaced by the execute request of a program
      specified by alt_exec feature.

      If this keyword is specified for a domain, the domain no longer
      executes any programs regardless of the mode of file access control
      (i.e. the domain won't execute even if MAC_FOR_FILE=0 ).
      Instead, the domain executes the program specified by alt_exec feature
      and the program specified by alt_exec feature validates the execute
      request and executes it if it is appropriate to execute.

      If you can tolerate that there is no chance to return an error code
      to the caller to tell the execute request was rejected,
      this is more flexible approach than in-kernel execve() parameter
      checking because we can do argv[] and envp[] checking easily.

Fix 2008/03/04

    @ Use string for access control mode.

      An integer expression for access control mode sometimes confuses
      administrators because profile number is also an integer expression.
      To avoid confusion between profile number and access control mode,
      I introduced a string expression for access control mode.

        Modes which take an integer between 0 and 3.

          0 -> disabled
          1 -> learning
          2 -> permissive
          3 -> enforcing

        Modes which take 0 or 1.

          0 -> disabled
          1 -> enabled

Fix 2008/03/10

    @ Rename "force_alt_exec" keyword to "execute_handler".

      To be able to use different programs for validating execve() parameters,
      I moved the location to specify the program's pathname from profile
      to domain policy.

      The "execute_handler" keyword takes one pathname which is
      invoked whenever execve() request is issued. Thus, any "allow_execute"
      keywords in a domain with "execute_handler" are ignored.
      This keyword is designed for validating expected/desirable execve()
      requests in userspace, although there is no way to tell the caller
      that the execve() request was rejected.

    @ Rename "alt_exec" keyword to "denied_execute_handler".

      The "denied_execute_handler" keyword takes one pathname which is
      invoked only when execve() request was rejected. In other words,
      this program is invoked only when the following conditions are met.

        (1) None of "allow_execute" keywords in the domain matched.
        (2) The execve() request was rejected in enforcing mode.
        (3) "execute_handler" keyword is not used by the domain.

      This keyword is designed for handling unexpected/undesirable execve()
      requests, to redirect the process issuing such requests to somewhere.

Fix 2008/03/18

    @ Fix wrong/redundant locks in pre-vfs functions.

      lock_kernel()/unlock_kernel() in pre_vfs_rename() were redundant for
      2.6 kernels.

      Locking order in pre_vfs_link() and pre_vfs_unlink() for 2.4 kernels
      after 2.4.33 were different from before 2.4.32 .

Fix 2008/03/28

    @ Disable execute handler loop.

      To be able to use "execute_handler" in a "keep_domain" domain,
      ignore "execute_handler" and "denied_execute_handler" keywords
      if the current process is executing programs specified by
      "execute_handler" or "denied_execute_handler" keyword.

      This exception is needed to avoid infinite execute handler loop.
      If a domain has both "keep_domain" and "execute_handler",
      any execute request by that domain is handled by an execute handler,
      and the execute handler attempts to process original execute request.
      But the original execute request is handled by the same execute handler
      unless the execute handler ignores "execute_handler".

    @ Update coding style.

      I rewrote the code to pass scripts/checkpatch.pl as much as possible.
      Function names were changed to use only lower letters.

Version 1.6.0 2008/04/01   Feature enhancement release.

Fix 2008/04/14

    @ Fix "Compilation failures" and "Initialization ordering bugs"
      with kernels before 2.4.30/2.6.11 .

      2.6 kernels before 2.6.9 didn't have include/linux/hardirq.h ,
      resulting compilation error at #include <linux/hardirq.h> .
      I added #elif condition.

      CentOS 4.6's 2.6.9 kernel calls do_execve() before initialization of
      ccs_alloc(), resulting NULL pointer dereference.
      I changed __initcall to core_initcall.

      CentOS 4.6's 2.6.9 kernel backported kzalloc() from 2.6.14 ,
      resulting compilation error at kzalloc().
      I modified prototype of kzalloc().

Fix 2008/04/20

    @ Fix "Compilation failures" with kernels before 2.4.30/2.6.11 .

      Turbolinux 10 Server's 2.6.8 kernel backported kzalloc() as an inlined
      function, resulting compilation error at kzalloc().
      I converted kzalloc() from an inlined function into a macro.

Fix 2008/04/21

    @ Add workaround for gcc 3.2.2's inline bug.

      RedHat Linux 9's gcc 3.2.2 generated a bad code
         if ((var_of_u8 & 0x000000BF) & 0x80000000) { }
      where the expected code is
         if ((var_of_u8 & 0xBF) & 0x80) { }
      when embedding ccs_acl_type2() into print_entry(),
      resulting runtime BUG().
      I added the expected code explicitly as a workaround.

Fix 2008/05/06

    @ Add memory quota.

      1.5.x returns -ENOMEM when FindNextDomain() failed to create a new
      domain, but I forgot to return -ENOMEM when find_next_domain() failed to
      create a new domain.

      A domain is automatically created by find_next_domain() only if
      the domain for the requested program doesn't exist.
      This behavior is for the administrator's convenience.
      The administrator needn't to know how many domains are needed for running
      the whole programs in the system beforehand when developing the policy.
      But the administrator does not want the kernel to reject execution of the
      requested program when developing the policy.

      So, I think it is better to grant execution of programs even if
      find_next_domain() failed to create a new domain than reject execution.
      Thus, I decided not to return -ENOMEM when find_next_domain() failed to
      create a new domain. This exception breaks the domain transition rules,
      so I print "transition_failed" warning in /proc/ccs/domain_policy
      when this exception happened.

      Also, to prevent the system from being halted by unexpectedly allocating
      all kernel memory for the policy, I added memory quota.
      This quota is configurable via /proc/ccs/meminfo like

        echo Shared:  1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo
        echo Private: 1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo

Version 1.6.1 2008/05/10   Bug fix release.

Fix 2008/06/04

    @ Check open mode of /proc/ccs/ interface.

      It turned out that I can avoid allocating memory for reading if
      FMODE_READ is not set and memory for writing if FMODE_WRITE is not set.

    @ Wait for completion of /sbin/ccs-init .

      Since 2.4 kernel's call_usermodehelper() can't wait for termination of
      the executed program, I was using the close() request of
      /proc/ccs/meminfo to indicate that loading policy has finished.
      But since /proc/ccs/meminfo could be accessed for setting memory quota
      by /etc/ccs/ccs-post-init , I stopped using the close() request.
      The policy loader no longer need to access /proc/ccs/meminfo to notify
      the kernel that loading policy has finished.

Fix 2008/06/05

    @ Fix realpath for pipes and sockets.

      Kernel 2.6.22 and later use different method for calculating d_path().
      Since fs/realpath.c didn't notice the change, the realpath of pipes
      appeared as "pipe:" rather than "pipe:[\$]" when they are opened via
      /proc/PID/fd/ directory.

    @ Add process's information into /proc/ccs/query .

      While /proc/ccs/grant_log and /proc/ccs/reject_log contain process's
      information, /proc/ccs/query doesn't contain it.
      To be able to utilize ccs-queryd and ccs-notifyd more, I added it into
      /proc/ccs/query .

Fix 2008/06/10

    @ Allow using patterns for globally readable files.

      To allow users specify locale specific files to globally readable files,
      I relaxed checking in update_globally_readable_entry().

Fix 2008/06/11

    @ Remove ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter.

      Since unexpected requests caused by doing software updates can happen
      in all profiles, users likely have to write ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=enabled
      to all profiles. And it makes meaningless to allow users to selectively
      enable specific profile's ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter.
      So, I removed ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter.
      Now, the system behaves as if ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=enabled is specified.
      The behavior of "delayed enforcing" mode is defined in the following
      order.

      (1) The requests are rejected immediately if nobody is opening
          /proc/ccs/query interface.
      (2) The requests will be rejected in 10 seconds if somebody other than
          ccs-queryd (such as less(1)) is opening /proc/ccs/query interface,
          for such process doesn't write dummy decisions.

Fix 2008/06/22

    @ Pass escaped pathname to audit_execute_handler_log().

      I was passing unescaped pathname to audit_execute_handler_log()
      which causes /proc/ccs/grant_log contain whitespace characters
      if execute handler's pathname contains whitespace characters.

Fix 2008/06/25

    @ Return 0 when ccs_may_umount() succeeds.

      I forgot to clear error value in ccs_may_umount() when the requested
      directory didn't match "deny_unmount" keyword. As a result, any umount()
      request with RESTRICT_UNMOUNT=enforcing returned -EPERM error.

Version 1.6.2 2008/06/25   Usability enhancement release.